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Abstract 
 Morocco has a long history as a sending country. However, in recent years, as civil, 
political, and economic unrest has uprooted many people, Morocco has emerged as a transit 
country for migrants attempting to reach Europe. Additionally, as borders have become tighter 
and as migration has become more financially burdensome, many have permanently settled in 
Morocco. In response to the relationship between Morocco and Europe, many instruments have 
been developed between the EU and Morocco to manage migration and mobility. In this study, 
using policy analysis and a semi-structured interview approach, I will examine the motives of the 
EU for allocating financial aid to Morocco. Through comparisons between the discourse of 
policy documents and the reality of the types of projects financial support is being allocated 
towards, this study seeks to determine what goals the EU is hoping to achieve by supporting 
Morocco financially. After examining these motives, I will analyze the implications of financial 
support on migration policy and internal responses to migration in Morocco. While the EU is a 
powerful entity, this study examines whether Morocco has been able to maintain sovereignty and 
protect its individual interests in their migration policies. In addition to the EU’s impact on 
Moroccan migration policy, this study investigates how the conditionality and nature of financial 
support of the EU has affected the activity and success of national NGOs.  
 
Research Question: What are the motives of the European Union to allocate foreign aid to 
Morocco for projects related to migration, and how will the rationale and conditions of this aid 
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Introduction 
Morocco has a long and complicated history of migration that has evolved in many ways 
as its political, social, economic realities, as well as the realities of surrounding countries, have 
changed. Throughout the migratory history of Morocco, outflows of Moroccans have been 
largely related to labor demand, colonial relationships, and family reunification. However, while 
Morocco has a long history as a sending country, in recent decades, this has changed. Since the 
mid-1990s, Morocco has become a popular transit country for Sub-Saharan migrants attempting 
to reach Europe. While most migrants travelling through Morocco intend to end up in Europe, 
because of the tightening of European border controls and the cost of migration, transit countries 
have become more permanent than many migrants originally expected.  
As Morocco has become one the most prominent points of access for migrants travelling 
to Europe, the EU has developed a strong interest in controlling and managing migratory flows 
and policies in this country, and has, in turn, built partnerships with Morocco to help manage 
migration and mobility. In order to strengthen and incentivize their partnership with Morocco, 
and as a way to influence the migration policies of Morocco, the EU has historically allocated 
financial aid to Morocco for managing migration in cooperation and coordination with EU 
migration policies. In this paper, I will first examine the strategic relationship between the EU 
and Morocco in regards to migration based on the policy agreements that these two bodies have 
agreed upon in recent history. Then, I will review the financial aid instruments tied to these 
policy agreements, assessing the EU’s motives, incentives, and conditionality in determining 
their aid allocation to Morocco for projects related to migration. Lastly, I will examine the 
implications of aid allocation from the EU for Moroccan migration policy and civil society. 
Through this analysis, I seek to understand the nature the relationship between the EU and 
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Morocco regarding migration, the motives of the European Union for allocating foreign aid to 
Morocco for projects related to migration, and how the rationale and conditionality of this aid 
will affect migration policy in the EU and Morocco, as well as the reality of migration flows to 
and from Morocco. 
Literature Review 
Foreign aid is the voluntary transfer of resources, mostly by developed countries, to 
developing countries. Foreign aid flows are meant to promote development and economic 
growth. However, there is more to the decision by donor countries to allocate aid than for purely 
philanthropic reasons. This literature review will cover the numerous motives behind a country’s 
decision to allocate aid, including past colonial relationships, the merit and political character of 
the recipient country, the political, security, and economic self-interest of the donor country, and 
to curb migration. After presenting the motives of donor countries, this literature review 
examines the effectiveness of foreign aid depending on certain characteristics. First, it will 
explore the relationship between migration and aid and whether foreign aid allocation can 
effectively curb migration rates. Lastly, it will examine coordination among donors and between 
donors and recipients, reviewing the literature on what relationships and practices lead to the 
most effective and efficient aid allocation and implementation.  
Donors’ Motives for Aid Allocation 
Donor countries do not typically have a single reason for providing aid to recipient 
countries. This decision is related to and dependent on various dynamics and interests. The first 
reason, cited in much of the literature on aid allocation motivation is related to colonial 
relationships. Studies have found that countries give the most aid to their former colonies, 
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regardless of other factors such as poverty, democratic status, or whether they are open to trade 
(Alesina and Dollar, 1998; Berthélemy, et. al, 2007). This may be the case because donor 
countries have existing political and economic relationships with these countries that they wish 
to maintain. However, it may also be related to migration patterns. Migrants from former 
colonies will often decide to migrate to the former colonial country because they have linguistic 
and cultural ties to the country. Thus, if the donor country wishes to curb migration, they may 
target aid towards places where there may be future migration from (Bermeo and Leblang, 
2015).  
The merit or political ideals of the receiving country is another consideration for donor 
countries cited in the literature. Some evidence shows that countries which have democratized 
seem to receive more aid directly following democratization, although there is no evidence that 
increases in aid will lead to democratization or trade liberalization (Alesina and Dollar, 1998). 
Alesina and Dollar have also found that while foreign aid projects respond more to political 
openness, foreign direct investment (FDI) responds more to economic openness (1998). 
However, much of the literature on this component finds that there is little evidence to support 
that countries consider the merit or political ideals of the receiving country significantly when 
allocating aid (Berthélemy, 2006). 
Perhaps the most significant consideration for aid allocation cited in the literature is the 
self-interest of the donor. Foreign aid allocation is typically dictated more by political, strategic, 
and economic considerations than the needs or merits of the receiving country (Berthélemy, 
2006; Lacomba and Boni, 2008; Bearce and Tirone, 2010; Alesina and Dollar, 1998). Countries 
will often give larger amounts of aid to trade partners or to countries with which they have a 
vested interest in maintaining positive political relationships, rather than considering which 
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countries are the most in need of aid (Berthélemy, 2006; Lacomba and Boni, 2008; Alesina and 
Dollar, 1998). Berthélemy argues that even within multilateral organizations, some countries 
may have more lobbying power, and will be able to influence which countries receive more aid 
depending on their individual interests (2006). While foreign aid is meant to assist countries in 
need, donor countries will often use foreign aid to support their own self-interest.   
Migration is a specific political, economic, and security concern among donor countries 
that has emerged in recent history. Migration rates have increased immensely over the last 
decades, and because of the various effects of migrants on receiving countries, many have sought 
ways to curb migration rates. Some countries have determined that an effective way to decrease 
migration is by increasing aid flows to sending countries. Evidence shows that as a donor’s 
migration policy become more restrictive, their aid contributions will increase (Bermeo and 
Leblang, 2015). Governments may view aid as a way to increase wages, increase helpful social 
services, and decrease inequality, which in turn reduces push factors and decreases demand for 
migration (Bermeo and Leblang, 2015). This is demonstrated by evidence that shows that donors 
tend to provide aid for specific types of programs such as job creation and wage support 
programs, which in the short-term likely affect the desire to migrate (Bermeo and Leblang, 
2015). Since there has generally been a consensus that development and economic growth 
reduces push factors and thus migration rates, many donor countries with restrictive migration 
policies have turned to aid allocation as a way to curb migration. 
Migration and Foreign Aid 
 As previously explained, many countries use aid flows as a method to curb migration. 
However, scholars disagree about the relationship between migration and aid regarding whether 
increases in foreign aid flows actually decrease migration flows. While the conventional 
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understanding is that foreign aid will reduce migration rates for reasons such as, if people have 
enough to cover their basic needs, they won’t need to emigrate, or if development projects create 
jobs, people will stay to fill these jobs (Lacomba and Boni, 2008). However, recent scholarship 
shows that the link between migration and aid is less straightforward. Several works discuss the 
hump-shaped income-migration linkage, referring to the idea that increases in a country’s GDP 
increase the migration rate until a certain income threshold (Berthélemy, et. al, 2007; Lanati and 
Thiele, 2018). For poorer households, below this threshold, higher aggregate aid increases 
income and thus eases financial constraints, freeing up individual funds to afford migration costs 
(Lanati and Thiele, 2018). However, for higher income households, higher aggregate aid, which 
leads to increase in income, does not make the difference between whether or not an individual 
or family can afford the migration costs (Lanati and Thiele, 2018). At this threshold level, which 
differs depending on migration costs (Berthélemy, et. al, 2007) it matters more whether aid 
programs are improving social services rather than increasing income. If the programs improve 
social services, this may improve living conditions, and reduce push factors (Lanati and Thiele, 
2018). Another reason that increases in foreign aid may actually increase migration rates is 
related to network channels. Contact with foreign development may increase exchanges of 
information and encourage people to build foreign contacts which they could use in the future to 
migrate (Lacomba and Boni, 2008; Lanati and Thiele, 2018). Recent literature on migration and 
aid has largely debunked the idea of a strong negative relationship between foreign aid flows and 
migration rates.  
 Although recent literature no longer agrees on the notion that increases in foreign aid 
flows decrease migration rates, some research shows that certain types of aid are more effective 
at curbing migration. In Gamso and Yuldashev’s work, they hypothesize that while economic 
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and social development assistance increases migration, political assistance decreases migration 
rates. This may be because governance-related assistance improves political institutions, which 
improves people's wellbeing and decreases the likelihood of them wanting to migrate (2018). 
Additionally, better political institutions via governance aid reduce corruption, and foster more 
political stability, democratic accountability, and governing factors, thus reducing push factors 
(Gamso and Yuldashev, 2018). While programs that are directed towards increasing individuals’ 
income may allow them the proper funds to migrate, governance aid leads to better political 
leaders and governments, but does not increase short-term material resources, thus improving 
quality of life without direct monetary support, and thus without increasing the likelihood of 
migration (Gamso and Yuldashev, 2018). Alternatively, Lanati and Thiele, who write about the 
hump-shaped migration-aid linkage discussed previously, argue that higher aggregate aid only 
decreases migration rates if it improves the quality of public services. If people’s quality of life 
and access to basic needs improves enough, they will have less motivation to migrate (2018). 
While the negative relationship between foreign aid flows and migration rates has been 
disparaged, there are still instances in which certain types of aid may lead to a decrease in 
migration flows.  
 Another element to consider regarding the relationship between migration and aid is 
diaspora communities. Evidence exists that large diasporas are associated with more bilateral 
trade between country of origin and destination (Dadush, 2015). Diaspora communities often act 
as lobbying forces in their host country regarding the allocation of foreign aid in their home 
country (Dadush, 2015; Bermeo and Leblang, 2015; Berthélemy, et. al, 2007). Additionally, 
diasporas can help minimize information asymmetry between donor countries and development 
projects in the home country and some diaspora associations will help coordinate community ties 
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and aid (Dadush, 2015). However, there are limits to the role of the diaspora in influencing 
foreign aid allocation. Firstly, restrictive home governments may be fearful of the influence and 
relative freedom of expression of the diaspora and thus unwilling to coordinate (Dadush, 2015). 
Additionally, migrants’ ability to influence aid allocation is dependent on their access to the 
political system in their host country, such as whether they are allowed voting rights (Bermeo 
and Leblang, 2015). Lastly, the motivation of the diaspora to lobby for more aid allocation in 
their home country depends on whether there is previously established positive engagement and 
cooperation between the diaspora and home country (Bermeo and Leblang, 2015; Dadush, 
2015). One way countries have built a positive relationship with their diaspora is by allowing 
migrants abroad to hold dual citizenship (Bermeo and Leblang, 2015; Dadush, 2015). Bermeo 
and Leblang find that when the aid recipient country allows its migrants abroad to have dual 
citizenship and the donor country allows migrants voting rights, the link between migrant 
population and aid will be greater (2015). Thus, diaspora communities have the capacity to 
influence policy in their home and host country as long as they are allowed political rights in 
their host country and as long as they have an established positive relationship with their home 
country.  
Coordinating Aid 
 Coordination among donors and between donors and receiving countries is an important 
component of the success of aid allocation in benefiting recipients. A lack of coordination can 
waste resources, reduce aid effectiveness, and lead to inefficient aid supply (Olivié and Pérez, 
2016). For example, if multiple aid agencies are working towards either the same or conflicting 
goals, this can waste the time and resources of employees and individual employees or 
organizations from building expertise (Skladany, 2017). Furthermore, increased coordination 
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could lead to more information sharing between parties so that donors and recipients are able to 
address the needs of their communities, problems within organizations, and the results of aid 
projects (Olivié and Pérez, 2016). Coordination generally makes aid allocation a more effective 
and efficient process.  
 According to the literature, different methods of coordination will result in different types 
of successes among donors and between donors and recipients. First, if NGOs from donor 
countries have personnel stationed in the recipient country, they will be able to better understand 
the needs of the community and monitor the success of the aid project from the field (Lacomba 
and Boni, 2008). However, while personnel from the donor country may be valuable, by training 
local experts and working with NGOs from the recipient country rather than relying on foreign 
consultants to implement aid projects, donors will create more jobs in the recipient country and 
increase program productivity by hiring those who understand local conditions (Skladany, 2017; 
Lacomba and Boni, 2008). Thorough and rigorous program evaluation is another important 
feature of coordination that is necessary in implementing successful foreign aid projects 
(Skladany, 2017; Lacomba and Boni, 2008; Olivié and Pérez, 2016). Rather than implementing 
an evaluation system in which recipients or project staff are interviewed, Skladany argues 
evaluators should compare test group of aid recipients to a control groups to see if a certain 
indicator has improved (2017). A combination of these methods of coordination should, in 
theory, lead to more efficient and productive aid implementation.  
 While much of the literature agrees that aid coordination would have a positive effect on 
aid projects, there are obstacles to cooperation that have often limited coordination efforts. 
Firstly, as discussed previously, the self-interest of the donor country is typically more important 
than recipients’ needs (Lacomba and Boni, 2008; Olivié and Perez, 2016; Skladany, 2017). For 
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example, rather than coordinating with other donor countries to build multilateral aid programs, 
some countries may prefer to emphasize their individual role in the development of a country, 
and will thus resist coordination efforts (Olivié and Perez, 2016). This is true for the case of 
Morocco, as they are a strategic geopolitical and geo-economic location, and countries such as 
Spain and France may want to assert their individual influence in the country rather than 
strengthening the EU’s role in global development (Olivié and Perez, 2016).  Additionally, donor 
states may have different internal procedures regarding sub-contracting, transferring funds, and 
signing agreements, making it more difficult to coordinate these processes with other donor 
states (Olivié and Perez, 2016). For example, the EU Delegation’s aid is allocated in 4-year 
cycles, but Germany, a donor to Morocco, negotiates agreements every two years and 
simultaneously implements regional 5-year programs (Olivié and Perez, 2016). Aside from 
obstacles to coordination among donor states, other obstacles may emerge due to the internal 
characteristics of recipient countries. There may be political differences or a lack of coordination 
within the institutional designs of recipient states, making it more difficult for them to administer 
and collect the information needed for proper coordination processes (Olivié and Perez, 2016). 
For example, in Morocco, the local government often employs a ‘divide-and-rule’ approach. 
Moroccan elites benefit from fragmented donors, as they are able to maintain more individual 
control (Olivié and Perez, 2016). Thus, Morocco has neither a national development plan nor a 
single body that governs development or development coordination strategy (Olivié and Perez, 
2016). 
Methodology 
 In my research, I will employ various methods in order to gather the appropriate findings 
and conduct proper analysis of these findings. I will begin with a historical overview of the 
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history of migration in Morocco to provide the proper context for the rest of my findings. Next, I 
will conduct a policy analysis of the existing agreements between the European Union and 
Morocco regarding migration. I will analyze various primary sources on this topic, including the 
agreements and policy documents that both groups have released as well as any reports that were 
produced following the implementation of these agreements. After an analysis of agreements 
between the EU and Morocco for managing migration and mobility, I will examine the financial 
instruments included in these documents. I will use primary sources to investigate what types of 
projects this support is being allocated towards, as well as what the motives and conditions are 
behind this aid. In addition to using documents released by the EU and the Moroccan 
government to acquire this information, I will conduct an interview with a migration scholar. 
This interview will provide more detailed information that may not be included in public policy 
documents as well as a less technical perspective on the characteristics, challenges, and 
implications of agreements between the EU and Morocco regarding the migration and mobility. 
 Following this policy analysis and examination of financial aid packages from the EU to 
Morocco, I will examine the recent politicization of aid allocated to projects for managing 
migration and mobility and how this has affected NGOs. I will begin by examining secondary 
sources that discuss how financial support from the EU for managing migration and mobility has 
become more politicized as the EU shifts from working to improve development and provide 
humanitarian support to controlling borders and minimizing migration flows. Originally, after 
this assessment, I hoped to conduct a case study of a national NGO in Morocco that receives aid 
from the European Union. However, I was not able to interview anyone from a national NGO 
that receives aid from the EU, and thus conducted my assessment of the EU’s influence on 
NGOs through secondary sources. 
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Through my policy analysis of agreements between the EU and Morocco, examination of 
financial support packages from the EU to Morocco, and evaluation of the effects of EU aid 
allocation on national NGOs, I will assess the rationale and strategic thinking of the EU in their 
decision to allocate aid to Morocco from managing migration and mobility, and will conclude 
with a discussion of the implications foreign aid from the EU will have on Moroccan migration 
policy and the future of migration flows in Morocco.   
 
Ethics 
 In this project, I follow all Human Subjects policies and ethical research guidelines. I did 
not interview any subjects in vulnerable positions. In my interview with a migration scholar, I 
received verbal consent to interview him, record the interview, and use any information from the 
interview for the purpose of my research. Additionally, I decided not to use his name in my 
report. In the interview, I asked mostly technical questions about topics such about Morocco’s 
relations with the EU, aid allocation from the EU, and the future of migration policy in Morocco 
from the perspective of an expert who has spent many years studying migration in Morocco. 
None of these questions were sensitive. 
Hypothesis 
 Based on my background knowledge of relations between the EU and Morocco, I predict 
my research will reveal that the motives behind EU aid allocation to Morocco for managing 
migration are largely related to the individual interests of the EU and member states. I believe 
the EU wants to curb migration in order to protect the security of the region, ensure that member 
states are not over capacity in terms of the amount of migrants they are able to protect and 
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support, and to appease groups that are against the large influx of migrants to the EU in recent 
years. Because of these interests, the EU has largely externalised border management to other 
countries, such as Morocco, in order to reduce their burden. I predict my research will reveal that 
part of the motivation of the EU to allocate aid to Morocco is to ensure that they will cooperate 
on border management measures.  
 I predict the implications of EU aid allocation to Morocco on Moroccan migration policy 
and the capacities of national NGOs will be mixed. I think my research will reveal that the EU 
has largely influenced migration policy in Morocco. However, Morocco does have other interests 
to maintain, which may reduce the EU’s influence. Regarding the implications for national 
NGOs in Morocco, I think the prioritization of the EU in managing borders and security will 
have negative effects on the capacities of national NGOs. I think my research will reveal that 
national NGOs are often unable to achieve their missions because of the conditionality of aid 
from the European Union.  
Findings 
Migratory History of Morocco 
Morocco has a long and complicated history of migration that has evolved in many ways 
as its political, social, and economic realities, as well as the realities of surrounding countries, 
have changed. The history of Morocco as a sending country is largely related to its colonial past. 
However, the outflow of Moroccans did not begin with French colonization of Morocco, but 
with French colonization of Algeria. At the beginning of the French colonization of Algeria, the 
demand for laborers on farms and in the expanding coastal cities ushered in an increasing 
amount of seasonal and circular migrants, including many Moroccans (de Haas, 2005). 
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Migration of Moroccans to France began during the French colonization of Morocco. During 
World War I and II, France recruited thousands of Moroccans to join the French army or work in 
factories and mines (de Haas, 2005). Additionally, in the 1950s and 60s, when France stopped 
recruiting Algerian workers during the Algerian war of independence, migration from Morocco 
increased exponentially (de Haas, 2005). Around the same time, economic growth in Western 
Europe resulted in great demand for low-skilled labor. In turn, Morocco signed labor recruitment 
agreements with the former West Germany (1963), France (1963), Belgium (1964), and the 
Netherlands (1969) (de Haas, 2005). The outflow of Moroccan migrants began to slow following 
the 1973 oil crisis, which created economic stagnation and thus rising unemployment and a 
lower demand for unskilled laborers in Western Europe; as a result, new visa requirements were 
introduced for Moroccans (de Haas, 2005). While guest workers claimed their visits were 
temporary, many did not return after 1973 (de Haas, 2005). Before this crisis, there was an 
abundance of circular migration between Europe and Morocco, but following the introduction of 
these new restrictions, migrants worried they would not be able to return to the receiving country 
if their return home was unsuccessful, and thus, many decided not to make the journey (de Haas, 
2005). In the 1980s and 90s, Spain and Italy began to replace France as the main destination 
country for Moroccan migrants (de Haas, 2005). However, because of restrictive immigration 
policies, many of these migrants were undocumented. Until the early nineties, when these two 
countries introduced visa requirements, many Moroccans entered on tourist visas and overstayed 
their visas (de Haas, 2005). Throughout the migratory history of Morocco, outflows of 
Moroccans have been largely related to labor demand, colonial relationships, and family 
reunification. 
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 Morocco has a long history as a sending country, but in recent decades, this has begun to 
change. Since the mid-1990s Morocco has become a popular transit country for Sub-Saharan 
migrants attempting to reach Europe (de Haas, 2005). Spain controls two cities on the northern 
tip of Morocco, Ceuta and Melilla. Thus, these are technically the closest cities for sub-Saharan 
migrants to enter the European continent through (Saddiki, 2010). Additionally, the shortest 
distance between Morocco and the Spanish mainland is a mere nine miles, making this route 
particularly appealing. The number of Sub-Saharan migrants began to increase during the mid-
1990s for reasons such as political unrest, civil war, ethnic violence and economic downturns 
(Kostas, 2017). At this time, irregular migration, mostly from West Africa, also increased 
(Kostas, 2017). Many irregular migrants followed specific routes to Morocco, and if they were 
not arrested by Moroccan authorities once they entered the country, they would attempt to enter 
Ceuta and Melilla in order to gain entry into EU territory (Kostas, 2017). Additionally, asylum 
seekers from the Middle East perceive Morocco as one of the stable and safe countries in the 
region, and have thus tended to use it as a transit country (Kostas, 2017). As Morocco has 
evidently become one the most prominent points of access for migrants travelling to Europe, the 
EU has established a strong interest in controlling and managing migratory flows and policies in 
this country.  
 While most of the migrants travelling through Morocco intend to end up in Europe, 
because of the tightening of European border controls and the cost of migration, transit countries 
have become more permanent than many migrants originally expected (Cherti and Grant, 2013). 
For migrants, there are benefits to staying in Morocco, such as relative stability, somewhat 
democratic politics, and educational opportunities (Cherti and Grant, 2013). However, for many, 
the experience of remaining in Morocco is not wholly positive. Many irregular migrants live in a 
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poverty and exclusion, experiencing difficult living and working conditions and a state of 
“protracted precariousness,” in which they have little to no access to healthcare, education, legal 
assistance, and other resources (Cherti and Grant, 2013). Additionally, they can live in this state 
of irregularity for years, as Morocco has not implemented a clear, comprehensible framework 
regarding how to acquire legal residency (Cherti and Grant, 2013). By failing to adopt an 
adequate framework for regularisation, the Moroccan government has turned a blind eye to the 
reality that irregular sub-Saharans are becoming an established, permanent part of the population 
(Cherti and Grant, 2013). NGOs may also benefit from the government’s avoidance of 
regularisation and legal status, as they are able to focus on the immediate humanitarian needs of 
irregular migrants rather than the issue of regularisation (Cherti and Grant, 2013). While the 
Moroccan government has avoided addressing this issue, over the last decade, the European 
Union has repeatedly pressured Morocco to make changes to their policy regarding readmission 
and regularization, in order to adhere to the needs and interests of EU member states. 
Agreements between the EU and Morocco  
 The first major agreement between the EU and Morocco that addresses some of the 
challenges discussed previously is the European Neighborhood Policy (ENP) (European 
Commission, 2013). The ENP is a framework for relations between the EU and its neighbors in 
the Southern Mediterranean, developed to improve partnerships based on common values in 
order to ultimately implement reforms for prosperity and stability in partner countries (European 
Commission, 2013). The four main domains of the ENP are good governance, democracy, rule 
of law and human rights; economic development for stabilisation; security; and migration and 
mobility (European Commission, 2013). The communique assures that all countries who follow 
these guidelines, would be “offered the prospect of a stake in the EU’s Internal Market and 
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further integration and liberalisation to promote the free movement of – persons, goods, services 
and capital” (Commission of the European Communities, 2003). Under the European 
Neighborhood Policy, the EU has developed Neighborhood Action Plans with various partner 
countries, including Morocco.  
According to the strategy paper produced by the European Commission regarding the 
European Neighborhood and Partnership Instrument for Morocco, “the EU’s strategy in Morocco 
has been to tackle Morocco’s two major concerns, which dominate the country’s political, 
economic and social agenda: to emerge from the spiral of weak growth, unemployment, poverty 
and migration and externally, make a success of implementing the Association Agreement and 
the Neighborhood Action Plan” (2013). The Association Agreement and Neighborhood Action 
Plan are plans for political and economic reforms with short and medium-term priorities of 3-5 
years (European Commission, 2013). Within these agreements, the EU works with partner 
countries, including Morocco, to “develop democratic, socially equitable and inclusive societies, 
and offers its neighbours economic integration, improved circulation of people across borders, 
financial assistance and technical cooperation toward approximation with EU standards” 
(European External Action Service, 2016). 
Included in these agreements are incentives provided by the EU for member states to 
comply with the established plans for reform. Firstly, the EU provides financial support to ENP 
countries, in the form of grants from the European Commission and loans from the European 
Investment Bank and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (European 
External Action Service, 2016). Additionally, ENP countries are able to participate in around 20 
EU programmes, but for formal participation and association within these programmes, they 
must first negotiate a formal Protocol (FPP) to the relevant Association Agreement (European 
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External Action Service, 2016). While the EU provides valuable incentives for ENP countries, 
there are also conditions to participating in these agreements and reaping the benefits (European 
External Action Service, 2016). An important principle developed within the European 
Neighborhood Policy instrument is the ‘more-for-more’ approach, meaning the more reforms 
member states implement, the more they are rewarded with additional financial and other support 
(European External Action Service, 2016). However, while this additional support includes 
market access (economic integration and development), mobility of people (mobility 
partnerships) and a greater share of EU financial support, it does not include humanitarian 
assistance, refugee and external border funds and support to civil society (European External 
Action Service, 2016). The ENP is the blanket framework under which more specific agreements 
have been developed.  
Another policy instrument that is important to the relationship between the EU and 
Morocco regarding migration is the Global Approach to Migration and Mobility (GAMM), 
which was adopted by the EU in 2005. The GAMM is a general framework of the EU external 
migration and asylum policy that highlights the priorities of the EU and outlines how the EU 
conducts policy dialogues and cooperation with non-member countries (Commission, 2011). The 
GAMM highlights four main priorities (Commission, 2011):  
1. Improving organization and management of legal migration. 
 2. Eradicating irregular migration and human trafficking. 
3. Increasing the development effects of migration.  
4. Advancing international protection and improving the external element of asylum.  
In the GAMM, the EU prioritizes partnerships with their southern and eastern neighbors as well 
as “migratory routes and countries of origin and transit of strategic interest to the EU,” including 
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Morocco, for reasons explained earlier in this paper and as indicated in the EU-Africa 
Partnership on Migration, Mobility and Employment (Commission, 2011). The EU will not be 
able to effectively manage migration and eradicate irregular migration and trafficking without 
working directly with the countries from which migrants are travelling. Thus, the EU  has 
developed ways to incentivize these countries to build partnerships with the EU that adhere to 
the union’s migration policies. 
The bilateral cooperation frameworks that are highlighted the most extensively in the 
Global Approach to Migration and Mobility are Mobility Partnerships (MP) and the Common 
Agendas for Migration and Mobility (CAMM). These are frameworks for dialogue and 
cooperation with partner countries including targets, commitments, and support measures offered 
by the EU. Many of these partner countries include African countries, as they are sources of high 
migration flows (Carrera et al., 2016). They have been incentivized with funding offers and 
promised channels of legal mobility for certain groups such as business people, academics, and 
students (Carrera et al., 2016). Both the CAMM and MP address the need for return and 
readmission of irregular migrants, a contentious issue in Moroccan domestic policy dialogue. 
However, while MP establishment would include the negotiation of visa facilitation and 
readmission agreements, a CAMM would not. Morocco has signed a mobility partnership, but 
not a Common Agenda of Migration and Mobility (Commission, 2011). This was a somewhat 
unanticipated decision for Morocco, as signing this partnership means agreeing to resume 
negotiations related to developing a readmission agreement. 
Readmission Negotiations 
Readmission negotiations between the EU and Morocco have been a long and tedious 
process that has yielded few results. In 2000, the EU entered negotiations with Morocco to 
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develop an EU Readmission Agreement (EURA) (Carrera et al., 2016), and since then, a total of 
fifteen rounds of unsuccessful negotiations have taken place, the last one on May 10, 2010 
(Wolff, 2014). In 2002, the EU allocated 70 million euros in aid for the development of Northern 
Morocco in order to encourage negotiations, as well as many other financial incentives since 
then, but the EU-Morocco Association Council declared early in the negotiations that it would be 
difficult to reach an agreement if member states could not credibly offer incentives other than 
financial aid, such as visa facilitation for certain groups (Wolff, 2014). While certain member 
states may have been willing to offer this, the EU as a whole was unable to commit to any 
comprehensive agreement for visa facilitation (Wolff, 2014). Thus, negotiations ended until 
2013, when Morocco signed an MP, agreeing to resume them. However, while the Mobility 
Partnership included incentives such as financial aid for “capacity building measures” and 
technical assistance on migration through methods including labor market programs, avoiding 
brain drain, and reducing fees for remittances and investment, Morocco has yet to restart the 
negotiations (Wolff, 2014).  
Various reasons exist for why the government may have determined that this is too 
important of a position to abandon. The most crucial reason may be that Morocco simply does 
not have the capacity or resources to sufficiently accommodate and protect the amount of 
migrants that would enter the country if they were to pass an agreement allowing the readmission 
of third country nationals as well as their own citizens (Carrera et al., 2016). This readmission 
policy is seen by many Moroccans as an unequal share of the burden between Morocco and the 
EU, as the EU has more capacity to provide adequate reception and protection for migrants 
(Carrera et al., 2016). In addition to the resources it would take to accommodate deported third 
country nationals, it would be expensive to provide financial support to Moroccan citizens who 
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return, and if they were abroad for a long time, it could be difficult to reintegrate them into 
Moroccan society (Carrera et al., 2016). Apart from capacity challenges, the decision not to 
allow the readmission of third country nationals may also be a political one. It is in Morocco’s 
best interest to maintain secure relations with African Union member states both for economic 
reasons and in order to retain partners who will defend the country’s Western Sahara policies 
(Carrera et al., 2016). Thus, it would be ill-advised for Morocco to cooperate with the EU 
regarding the deportation of citizens of African countries. As the migration scholar I talked with 
noted, “Morocco cannot claim to deal with migration on a humanitarian basis and then accept a 
policy that is regarded as inhuman.” Additionally, he noted that Morocco has been criticized in 
the past for not addressing migration in a way that adhered to instruments such as the 
International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of 
Their Families. He argued that Morocco needed to find a way to address that they were doing 
something about the migrants that had been living in their country in a precarious and vulnerable 
manner. For the stated economic, social, and political reasons, Morocco, up to this point, has not 
been able negotiate a sufficient agreement with the European Union.  
While the reasons for Morocco not to agree to the readmission clause are well-founded, 
many believe that if the EU were able to provide incentives that were sufficiently valuable to 
Morocco, they would at least restart negotiations. The fact that they have not resumed 
negotiations indicates that EU’s incentives have been insufficient. In previous negotiations, the 
most prominent selling point for Morocco was not financial aid, but visa facilitation, which 
would allow easier modes for certain groups to acquire visas (Wolff, 2014). Originally, the visa 
facilitation for readmission policy approach was meant to be negotiated through parallel 
negotiations between Morocco and member states that would eventually lead to a single EU 
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package deal (Carrera et al., 2016). However, early indications from the negotiations showed that 
there were still major disagreements about these policies, and that any agreement to visa 
facilitation would be restricted and only allow limited mobility opportunities (Carrera et al., 
2016). Thus, in the case of Morocco, the financial, social, and political losses the country would 
risk if they agreed to the readmission of third country nationals and Moroccan citizens is not 
outweighed by the benefits of EU incentives.  
EU Financial Support for Morocco 
 Since 2014, the European Union has allocated approximately 232 000 000 EUR to 
Morocco for managing migration through programmes implemented by UN agencies, EU 
member states, civil society organisations, public institutions in coordination with agreements 
between the EU and Morocco (European Commission, 2018). The largest percentage of this aid 
has gone towards migration management, border management and mobility (40% or 92.8M 
EUR), followed by the fight against migrants smuggling and human trafficking (33% or 77.3M 
EUR), governance of migration policies, institutional support and capacity building (13% or 
28.5M EUR), protection, resilience, rights of migrants (10% or 23.1M EUR), and lastly, socio-
economic integration of migrants (4% or 10.1M EUR) (European Commission, 2018). Most of 
this aid is allocated through the EU Emergency Trust Fund for Africa and the European 
Neighborhood Instrument.  
 The Emergency Trust Fund for stability and addressing root causes of irregular migration 
and displaced persons in Africa (the EUTF for Africa) was established at 2015 Valletta Summit 
on Migration (European Commission: The EU Emergency Trust Fund for Africa, 2018). The 
purpose of the EUTF for Africa is to increase stability, improve migration management, and 
address the root causes of displacement, destabilization, and irregular migration through the 
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coordination of funding and expertise from the EU and other donors (European Commission: 
The EU Emergency Trust Fund for Africa, 2018). The EU Emergency Trust Fund for Africa 
allocates EUR 64 580 000 to five national projects in Morocco, all of which are dedicated to the 
purpose of “improved migration management” (European Commission: The EU Emergency 
Trust Fund for Africa, 2018). These five projects are (European Commission: The EU 
Emergency Trust Fund for Africa, 2018):   
1. Living together without discrimination: an approach based on Human Rights and 
the gender dimension - EUR 5 500 000 
2. Legal Empowerment of Migrants - EUR 4 580 000  
3. Assistance to migrant people in vulnerable situations - EUR 6 500 000 
4. Deployment of Migration Policies at Regional Level - EUR 8 000 000  
5. Support for integrated border management and migration in Morocco - EUR 40 
000 000  
 In addition to the five national projects funded through the EU Emergency Trust Fund for 
Africa, in July 2018, the fund adopted the Border Management Programme for the Maghreb 
region (BMP Maghreb) (European Union, 2018). Through this program, Morocco will receive an 
additional 30 million euros  (European Union, 2018). The purpose of this program is to combat 
and mitigate risks of irregular migration by “enhancing the institutional framework of interested 
countries to protect, monitor and control the borders, in line with a right-based approach that 
identifies and mitigates risks to rights holders at borders, while ensuring the free movement of 
bona fide travelers and goods” (European Union, 2018). For Morocco, this means strengthening 
border capacities by improving control, surveillance, planning, communication, and coordination 
along the border  (European Union, 2018). The main beneficiaries of this support are not NGOs, 
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but rather the Ministry of the Interior, and more specifically the Directorate General of the 
National Security (DGSN), the Directorate General of Territorial Surveillance (DGST), the 
Moroccan Auxiliary Forces (FAM), and the Moroccan Royal Gendarmerie (GRM) (European 
Union, 2018).  
Politicization of EU Aid 
 In 2015, EU member states agreed to the European Agenda on Migration after the EU 
received over half-a-million asylum applications in 2014 and twice as many in 2015 
(CONCORD, 2018). This agenda outlined cooperation with third countries in response to the 
migration crisis with a focus on “addressing the root causes behind irregular migration in non-
EU countries” (CONCORD, 2018). The practical effects of the new agenda were outlined in EU 
Action Plan on Return, the Valletta Summit on Migration, and the Migration Partnership 
Framework (CONCORD, 2018). While there was humanitarian rhetoric throughout these 
agreements, the actual policy agenda and budget mostly were dedicated to the curbing of 
“irregular” migration to Europe (CONCORD, 2018). For example, the Action Plan on Return 
says that the only way to decrease the incentives for migration flows to Europe is to substantially 
increase the return percentage of detained irregular migrants to their countries of origin 
(CONCORD, 2018).  
 In addition to the differences between rhetoric and actually policy goals explicated in the 
above agreements, in recent years EU migration policies have allowed aid to stray from its main 
purposes of reducing poverty and protecting human rights. The EU has allowed aid to deviate 
from its original purposes through various mechanisms. The first mechanism is aid inflation 
(CONCORD, 2018). For example, resources reported as aid spent in donor countries to support 
refugees arriving in the donor country are eligible as Official Development Assistance (ODA) 
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for the first twelve months of the refugee’s stay (CONCORD, 2018). By labelling this as ODA, it 
appears that this money is aid going to developing countries, but the donor country is not 
actually providing any resources to the developing country (CONCORD, 2018). While this is 
inaccurate accounting of aid allocation, it is also inconsistent with the purpose of ODA, which is 
to promote economic development and welfare in developing countries (CONCORD, 2018). 
Another mechanism is aid diversion. One of the important themes of EU strategy is “addressing 
the root causes of migration” (CONCORD, 2018). This strategy is seen in EU development 
cooperation policy, such as the Emergency Trust Fund for Africa, which “aims to address the 
root causes of destabilisation, forced displacement and irregular migration, by promoting 
economic and equal opportunities, security and development” (CONCORD, 2018). This means 
supporting projects for employment, food and nutrition, and conflict prevention (CONCORD, 
2018). However, the trust fund also supports “migration management,” including the prevention 
of irregular migration, border control, and return and readmission policies (CONCORD, 2018). 
In fact, “Support for integrated border management and migration in Morocco” and the newly 
instituted Border Management Programme for the Maghreb region make up about 70 million of 
the 90 million euros that the trust fund dedicates to Morocco (European Union, 2018; European 
Commission, 2018). Because of this shift, countries may begin to invest in the trust fund 
depending on migratory flows rather than the needs of recipient countries. The last mechanism is 
the conditionality of aid. Aid is becoming increasingly conditional of whether partner countries 
cooperate in migration and border control efforts (CONCORD, 2018). Sometimes this 
conditionality is explicitly stated in public agreements, but often, rather than talk about the 
conditionality publicly, conditions are discussed privately in the European Council’s debates 
(CONCORD, 2018). These mechanisms for aid diversion have allowed the EU to subtly place 
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more emphasis on and provide more support for border control and management than for 
promoting development and protecting human rights.  
 Many NGOs dedicated to migration issues have been very critical of this phenomenon, as 
most of their missions are related more to development and humanitarian assistance than border 
management. They believe that it is important to avoid cooperation between humanitarian and 
civil protection actors, as this can cause “mission creep, or “the watering-down of the distinction 
between humanitarian and security issues” (European Parliament Research Service, 2018). In 
2016, a joint NGO statement was released in response to the European Commission’s 
Communication on a new Partnership Framework with third countries, a framework developed 
to curb migration through the EU and Member States’ existing external cooperation instruments 
and tools (Joint NGO statement, 2016). This statement states, “Aid is for the benefit of people in 
need, and should not be used as a leverage for migration control. EU funding should be 
transparent and adhere to clearly established principles, such as the Busan principles on 
effectiveness and the Paris principles of ownership by and alignment to partner countries’ 
strategies” (Joint NGO statement, 2016). This statement also emphasizes that aid should account 
for the complex realities of migration, should be based on needs and evidence, and should ensure 
the maximization of migration benefits as well as the minimization of migration risks (Joint 
NGO Statement, 2016). Many are critical of the politicization of EU financial support, because 
rather than supporting the humanitarian needs of recipient countries, the EU has started to use 
finances as a policy tool in which they are able to use NGOs as a means of strengthening border 
control and management.  
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Analysis and Discussion 
 It is difficult to assess the reality of EU migration policy in Morocco solely from the 
agreements between the EU and Morocco and the programs developed by the EU for Morocco. 
The European Neighborhood Policy, Global Approach to Migration and Mobility, and Mobility 
Partnerships all emphasize human rights, empowerment, and protection for migrants and the EU 
funds many projects in Morocco dedicated to missions such as eradicating discrimination, 
assisting migrants in vulnerable positions and generally improving the economic, social, and 
physical wellbeing of migrants. While all of these policies and programs align with the human-
rights aspects of Morocco’s migration policies and the 2017 Global Compact for Safe, Orderly 
and Regular Migration, they are very vague and provide few details about the implementation of 
structural reforms and how these reforms will benefit migrants.  
 Aid allocation data and the mechanisms through which the EU has diverted aid, such as 
aid inflation and conditionality, are much more revealing of the motives of the EU for allocating 
aid to Morocco for managing migration and mobility. In recent years, the EU has externalized 
migration management, placing much of the burden on third countries such as Morocco to help 
curb irregular migration. This is evidenced in the EU’s ‘more-for-more’ approach, in which 
recipient countries receive more aid if they agree to additional cooperation on migration 
management, such as border controls, surveillance measures, or readmission agreements (Carrera 
et al., 2016). While the EU is not explicit about the amount of funding they allocate to Morocco 
for border control and management, the funding breakdown of instruments like the EU Trust 
Fund for Africa reveal that a disproportionate amount of funding is going towards border 
management compared to the legal empowerment of migrants or assistance to migrants in 
vulnerable positions. Additionally, the European Union releases a very limited amount of data 
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regarding their spending, and the information they do release is often not current. Thus, this 
created a limitation to my findings; I was not able to find exact data on the recent projects the EU 
is funding in Morocco for managing migration and mobility.  
 While it would seem that the power and financial support of the EU would have great 
influence on Moroccan migration policy, Morocco has successfully preserved their individual 
interests in negotiations with the EU and the changes they have made to their internal migration 
policies. They have not budged on negotiating a readmission policy, proving that the incentives 
of the EU do not outweigh the losses the government would suffer if they were to negotiate a 
readmission agreement. As the migration scholar I interviewed discussed, by refusing to resume 
these negotiations, Morocco is appeasing human-rights groups as well as its Southern neighbors, 
but at the same time, they know they do not risk losing funding from the EU, as they continue to 
be an important strategic partner. They are an essential partnership to maintain if the EU wishes 
to advance their border control and security goals. Additionally, Morocco likely benefits from 
the lack of unification among the EU. It would be difficult for the EU to cut off aid to Morocco 
for their lack of negotiation because individual member states have a vested interest in protecting 
their relationship with the country.  
 My assessment of the effect of financial support from the EU on national NGOs in 
Morocco is limited as I was unable to interview anyone from a Moroccan NGO that receives EU 
aid. However, by examining secondary sources such as the joint statement released by 104 
NGOs regarding the politicization of EU aid for projects related to migration, it seems that 
national NGOs in Morocco have likely been harmed by the shift of EU aid from supporting 
projects related to human rights and the eradication of poverty to projects supporting border 
management and the eradication of irregular migration. By using financial support as a public 
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policy tool, the European Union is largely abandoning many of its core principles and neglecting 
many of the pressing needs of recipient countries.  
 
Conclusion 
 In recent years, the mass increase in migration rates has affected the stability and capacity 
of the European Union and member states. In response, the EU has securitized in many ways. 
They have not only strengthened their own borders, but externalized border control and 
management to sending or transit countries, such as Morocco. The EU has incentivized 
Morocco’s participation in border management activities through financial support instruments 
established in various agreements. As seen in the data available regarding the breakdown of EU 
aid to Morocco as well as articles written about recent changes to EU aid, the financial support 
that the EU is allocating has become much more politicized in recent years. An increasingly 
large amount of aid is going towards border management and securitization projects than 
towards humanitarian aid projects or the eradication of poverty.  
 While this aid may have relieved some of the burden of the EU for managing borders, 
Morocco has resisted the influence of the EU on national migration policy. Morocco has 
declined to resume readmission negotiations and has made changes to their migration policy, not 
for the sake of the EU’s interest, but for their own strategic purposes, such as to foster a positive 
relationship with their southern neighbors and appease the interest of human rights groups. 
However, national NGOs in Morocco have been less successful as escaping the control of the 
EU. The EU, by allocating more aid towards projects regarding border management and the 
eradication of irregular migration, has prevented NGOs from supporting the critical needs of 
migrants in Morocco. 
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 Based on my findings, I recommend that the EU reconsiders the types of projects they are 
allocating aid towards. They have far more resources and capacity to manage borders and it is 
unfair to place an unequal amount of the burden on sending and transit countries. Additionally, 
increases in border management and control are not necessarily the most effective way to curb 
migration flows. Allocating aid towards projects that increase quality of life and eradicate 
poverty in the home country may reduce push factors. For Morocco, I recommend the 
government continues to consider the nation’s own interests rather than those of the European 
Union. However, I am also weary that their interests are not aligned with humanitarian needs. 
For a long time, Morocco has ignored that they are no longer solely a transit country, but a 
country that has become home to many migrants. It is necessary that they implements programs 
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